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ABSTRACT 
MEETING IN THE MIDDLE: THE IMPACT OF SINGLE-PARTY  
DOMINANCE ON PARTISAN POLITICS 
by William Samuel Adcock 
May 2015 
Polarization within the American government has reached near historic levels in 
recent decades. One of the most readily apparent results of this partisan atmosphere is the 
increase in the number of American states that are almost totally controlled by one of the 
two major political parties. This study seeks to examine the effect this single-party 
domination has on the policy positions of Senate candidates of the minority parties in 
these states. It is hypothesized that minority party candidates seeking election in these 
states will be more likely to adopt policy positions more commonly associated with the 
platforms of the majority party in an effort to remain viable, leading to increased levels of 
political homogeneity.  
In an effort to measure these policy deviations, the campaign websites of Senate 
candidates for each state over three elections will be examined, and positions regarding 
five typically polarized issues will be recorded. These positions will then be compared to 
the official platforms of the two parties’ national organizations. Candidates will be scored 
on a party loyalty scale according to their adherence to or deviation from their party’s 
official position. Using these scores, candidates from single-party dominated states will 
be compared to their counterparts from more competitive states to gain a clearer picture 
of the true nature of political competition. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the 2014 election, a long-term incumbent Senator in Mississippi faced a 
challenge from a Democratic candidate.  Thad Cochran was a Republican running in one 
of the most solidly Republican states, for a seat he has held since the early 1970’s.  His 
Democratic challenger, Travis Childers, was never considered more than the longest of 
long shots to win, considering the deep and abiding loyalty enjoyed by the Republican 
Party in the South in general, and especially in deep red Mississippi. 
 However, as the race unfolded Travis Childers began hewing further and further 
from the generally understood Democratic Party policy stances.  From his opposition to 
marriage equality, to his extremely conservative stance regarding abortion, Childers 
began to look less and less like a Democrat and more and more like a conservative 
Republican. In a state that is so clearly dominated by the Republican Party, perhaps Mr. 
Childers thought his only chance to remain at all viable as a candidate lay in adopting the 
conservative policies he knew the constituency he was vying to represent favored.  This 
raises an important question: Are minority party candidates more likely to adopt policies 
of the majority party in single-party dominated states?  
 There are certain logical benefits to a candidate abandoning the typical policy 
positions of the national party to which he belongs.  There are also obvious downsides to 
such policy deviations.  There is a great deal of electoral math and strategy calculation 
that must be done in order to decide if the rewards outweigh the risk for each particular 
candidate, not least among them the electoral makeup and policy desires of the 
constituency they hope to represent. 
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 I argue that in states dominated by one of the two major political parties, minority 
party candidates would consider this a necessary tactic.  To abandon the generally held 
policies of the party a candidate ostensibly represents seems to fly in the face of the entire 
purpose behind political parties.  However, if clinging to the positions of a candidate’s 
national party is tantamount to political suicide, there is certain logic in abandoning those 
policies in favor of positions the candidate knows to be preferred by the electorate.  This 
phenomenon is most likely to present itself in states where the challenger stands little to 
no chance of beating an entrenched incumbent in a primary election or clawing his or her 
way into an established majority party hierarchy.  In the case of the aforementioned 
Mississippi Senatorial race, Thad Cochran has held his seat since 1978, and is currently 
the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, giving him a strong hand in 
spending legislation within the Federal government. This is the kind of influence that can 
make an incumbent much more difficult to defeat in a primary. Attempting to run as a 
member of the minority party removes the roadblock of a long-term incumbent, who has 
had an entire career to accrue power and influence to help maintain a massive incumbent 
advantage. 
  It is important to incorporate the current understanding of political campaigns 
with the behavior of modern candidates.  As there is little evidence to show that the 
modern partisan climate will moderate any time soon, the effect that these single-party 
dominated states are having on candidate policy positions will likely be an important 
consideration for candidates for years to come.  It is important to understand if these 
policy deviations are having any effect on the actual governance of the country as well. 
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  In the second chapter, this thesis will review the theories and studies that have 
established our current understanding of political campaigns and the motivations that 
drive men and women to seek office, despite the rigorous and punishing road to election.  
The growth in the number of single-party dominated states will also be examined, 
including factors that lead to political homogeneity within a state’s citizens.  It will also 
lay out the historical advantages of party identification for candidates, as well as the 
modern climate of party and ideological purity.  Of particular interest will be the 
influence of the modern Tea Party wing of the Republican Party and its effect on policy 
deviation by Republican Party candidates.  Finally, factors other than being a member of 
the minority party that can contribute to ideological deviation will be discussed, such as a 
candidate’s personal beliefs and the weight of local concerns that may not be addressed in 
national party policy. 
 The third chapter will explain the methods by which such policy deviations will 
be measured.  Additionally, the factors that establish a state as single-party dominated or 
politically competitive will be discussed.  Also found within this chapter will be a 
breakdown of the specific policies that will be used to compare individual candidate 
positions to those of their national parties, as well as a guide to the scoring system that 
will be employed to quantify those positions.  As this scoring system is unique to this 
thesis, it is important to understand how the candidates have been scored and how the 
challenges regarding subjectivity have been addressed. 
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  The fourth chapter will contain the results of this study.  These results will be 
broken down by party affiliations as well as the political competition levels of the states.  
The results of the examination of the fluctuations in the number of single-party 
dominated states will also be presented and discussed. 
 The fifth chapter will explain the significance of the observed results.  Possible 
explanations for any unexpected results will be offered, along with an examination of 
where this thesis fits into the preexisting literature and understanding of campaigns and 
party competition.  Finally, avenues for additional study will be explored, including the 
expansion of the years studied and the inclusion of data from campaigns for the House of 
Representatives. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Election and Reelection 
My hypothesis hinges on two primary ideas in the political science scholarship.  
The first is that the established nature of Congressional elections help to explain the 
behavior of minority party candidates facing a largely unfriendly electorate.  The second 
is the party identification literature shows a competing set of theories revolving around 
the benefits of the heuristic nature of party identification, and the detrimental effects of 
single-party domination in American politics.  This thesis seeks to explain how these two 
factors collide in the modern political atmosphere.   
 David Mayhew literally wrote the book on Congressional elections.  He 
argues that Congressional service has become an attractive long-term career citing the 
“good pay and high prestige” offered to those serving in the Congress (Mayhew 1974).  
Some authors have attempted to quantify the actual monetary value of a Congressional 
seat, as a function of the value of private sector jobs rejected by representatives in favor 
of remaining in Congress (Diermeier, et al. 2005).  Surely, the paycheck of a 
Congressman (a base salary of $174,000, as of 2014) is an attractive benefit, but hardly a 
king’s ransom, considering the cost of maintaining residence in Washington D.C. in 
addition to a representative’s home district.  Additionally, the strain placed upon 
candidates for such offices during campaigns for election make the salary seem even less 
attractive, when measured against the constant stress, pressure, and scrutiny that is now 
focused on even the most mundane of Congressional contests.  Logically, there must be a 
perk beyond simple monetary remuneration and the stellar health plan. 
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Certainly, the power offered by a seat in Congress must have a powerful draw for 
those who seek such appointment.  Whether they seek such power for altruistic purposes, 
such as making good public policy, as Fenno suggests (1996) or for more venal reasons 
(ego, or power for power’s own sake), the ultimate reward for those who are elected is a 
seat at the table and a say in the operations of the Federal government. Dodd sees this as 
the basis for Mayhew’s assertion of representatives being so reelection minded, though 
he stops short of Mayhew’s accusation of being “single-minded” (Dodd 1977).  He 
argues that a desire to accrue personal power underscores the desire for election and, 
subsequently, reelection beyond all other concerns. 
So, for this study, the research question becomes, why would a candidate in a 
single-party dominated state run as a member of the minority party while adopting the 
policy positions of the majority party instead of simply running as a member of the 
majority party?  It would seem counter-intuitive to align oneself with a party that suffers 
from a general disadvantage in elections by virtue of its general policy positions, such as 
the Democrats in the state of Alabama.  However, there are logical reasons for a 
candidate, especially a relative neophyte, to align with a party that consistently finds 
itself in the minority in a given state.  When confronted with the challenge of an 
entrenched incumbent, minority party status can be a necessary gamble. 
 If Congressmen are, indeed, “single-minded seekers of reelection” (Mayhew 1974), 
it stands to reason that challengers would be single-minded seekers of election.  
Candidates must be wholly focused on the positioning and execution that will see them 
accepting a concession speech on election night, rather than delivering one.  A primary 
concern in this pursuit is the initial strength of the challenger.  One of the most important 
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factors for a challenger seeking election is the strength of the incumbent candidate 
(Lazarus 2007).  As politically experienced candidates have waded through the 
difficulties of elections already, they are more likely to choose to participate in races they 
stand a good chance of winning, rather than tilting at electoral windmills.    They also 
often benefit from an established base from which to raise campaign funds, as well as a 
level of name recognition that is not often available to non-experienced candidates 
(Maestas and Rugeley 2008).  Beginning a race in a favorable position to receive money 
and recognition, while targeting a vulnerable incumbent is the optimal situation for any 
challenger; however, it is not a common situation. 
 Incumbency offers a myriad of advantages in an election.  From the franking 
privilege to the opportunities for constituent service that come with holding 
Congressional office, once a candidate is elected they instantly improve their chances for 
reelection.  Voters see those who have already attained elected office as more desirable, 
and research has shown that the mere impression of incumbency strength can deter even 
qualified potential challengers from throwing their hats into the ring (Ashworth and de 
Mesquita 2008; Stone and Maisel 2003).  As incumbents increase their time in office, 
their advantage typically grows, commensurate with their stature.  Committee 
assignments, chairmanships, and greater visibility all contribute to a powerful protection 
against upstart challengers, as these all offer a greater number of opportunities for 
advertising, credit claiming, position taking, and constituent service from which the 
incumbent gathers a major advantage (Mayhew 1974).  This can have the effect of 
scaring away even high quality challengers. 
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This obstacle is even more daunting for those who would challenge an incumbent 
from within the incumbent’s own political party.  In the case of a Republican challenger 
attempting to unseat a Democratic incumbent, at the very least the challenger can rely on 
the heurisitic differences between the two parties to provide some voter support.  
Republican voters will most likely vote for the Republican candidate.  What reason, 
however, does a Democratic voter in this hypothetical situation have for voting for 
another Democratic candidate who would challenge the incumbent Democrat in the 
primary?  Considering all the advantages a long-term Congressman can offer his district, 
trading that person out for a freshman doesn’t seem logical.  Also, assuming the 
challenger succeeds, the incumbency advantage is lost in the general election, potentially 
opening up the seat to the Republican challenger (Bianco 1984). 
 Additionally, the national party organization is unlikely to financially or logistically 
back a challenger versus a seated incumbent.  As a party organization is a logical 
extension of the individual candidates’ single-mindedness when it comes to election, the 
organization’s focus must remain with winning as many campaigns as possible 
(Jacobson, 1985).  In fact, Damor and Hansford (1999) find that, despite the fact that a 
vulnerable incumbent would seem to be the most logical target for a challenger, research 
shows that national party organizations are more likely to pump larger sums of money 
into the campaigns of those incumbents they see as most in danger of losing their seat.  
This can have the effect of making the challenger’s task even more difficult. 
 Essentially, a candidate who finds himself in a political situation dominated by 
long-term incumbents could logically find an easier path to election by bypassing the 
entrenched political structure of the dominant party by attempting to align with the 
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minority party that may have a lower quality pool of candidates from which to recruit.  
Additionally, the hypothetical candidate could use policy overlap between themselves 
and the majority candidates to position themselves as a “moderate” or “centrist” 
candidate, a synthesis of the policies favored by the majority party of the state and the 
less divisive policies of the minority party.  For instance, the aforementioned Senatorial 
campaign that found Travis Childers attempting to unseat incumbent Thad Cochran saw 
Childers assuming strong pro-gun and pro-life stances, among others.  These positions, 
heavily favored by the Republican majority in Mississippi, were tempered with positions 
in favor of a higher minimum wage and increasing education spending, issues which 
typically see less vociferous opposition from conservative voters.  Through this hybrid of 
policy positions, Childers positioned himself as a more “centrist” alternative to the 
entrenched Republican leadership of the state.  By positioning himself at this crossroads 
of policy positions, Childers stood a chance to syphon Republican votes away from 
Senator Cochran, as well as maintain his minority Democratic base through party loyalty. 
Party Identification 
The literature regarding the value of heuristics as they concern political parties is 
well documented (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Lodge and Hammill 1986), and the 
usefulness of these heuristics to those parties is common knowledge.  However, this 
study seeks to show that party identification is less useful as a heuristic when that 
identification results in a death blow to a campaign before it even begins.  Downs (1957) 
described political parties as creators of a kind of “brand name”, a general understanding 
of what the party stood for, and what could be expected of those candidates that 
campaigned under the party’s banner.  When a voter is not perfectly informed as to the 
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policy stances of the candidates in an election, a quick glance at the political party they 
identify with can answer a myriad of questions.  This reliance on heuristics can play a 
key roll for challengers to established incumbents.  Even though heuristics can often 
cause voters to make “bad” decisions (voting for a member of the voter’s preferred party, 
lacking the knowledge that the candidate holds positions that are not in line with their 
party’s generally understood stances, for instance), research has indicated that citizens 
continue to rely on them (Dancey and Sheagley 2013; Lau and Redlawsk 2001). 
If a challenger runs as a member of “Party A”, less informed or uninformed voters 
who favor the generally understood policy positions of that party are likely to vote for the 
candidate, unaware that the heuristic shortcut they are using is not accounting for the 
policy deviations that candidate may make.  In fact, Goren (2005) suggests that, even 
knowing about deviations made by candidates, voters may still vote for a candidate of 
their preferred party.  Goren finds that party identification is more stable among voters 
than even their self-described core political values, and that party identification may even 
shape many core political values, rather than the reverse.  This dedication to a political 
party identification could serve to insulate a candidate from a certain amount of backlash 
from his political base, as the voter will often rationalize their party preference despite 
policy divergences (Rahn, et al. 1994).  This is especially true of relatively uninformed 
voters, as their reliance on the heuristic nature of party identification is stronger than the 
informed voter’s. 
However, there is a counter argument to the protective nature of party heuristics 
that has emerged in the highly partisan atmosphere of modern day American politics.  
The two major parties of the American political system have never been farther apart 
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(Poole and Rosenthal 2007), and the disagreements of the political elites have trickled 
down to the electorate (Abramowitz 2010).  Murakami (2008) argues that the widespread 
use of new communication technologies has combined with the relative homogeneity 
within each party to produce significant levels of partisan disagreement.  Since its genesis 
in the slow takeover of the South by the Republican Party, the two parties have both 
gravitated to their respective ideological extremes.   
A symptom of this divide is a new focus on party purity, or the insistence that 
members of the parties not deviate from the national party’s positions.  This de facto 
litmus test that is applied to candidates seeking election or reelection has resulted in 
upheaval among even historically safe incumbents.  Influential ideological groups such as 
Club for Growth and MoveOn.org make no secret of their distaste for those they see as 
ideologically impure, going to far as to label them “traitors” to the cause (Murakami 
2008).  Indeed the recent Tea Party movement has famously ousted long-serving, 
influential incumbents based on accusations that they lacked records that were 
sufficiently conservative.  The effect of this purity test on candidates of minority parties 
that espouse positions more in line with the majority party has not been sufficiently 
studied, but it is fairly safe to say that is could strike a death blow to the campaign of an 
ideologically flexible candidate in a party primary election.   
I believe this Tea Party induced purity requirement will make it far less likely that 
Republican candidates will feel comfortable deviating from their national platform, as the 
threat of a primary challenge is much more overt.  Democrats, on the other hand, lack 
such a powerful hardline contingent within their party to enforce party discipline and 
loyalty, which I believe will result in more frequent and extreme examples of policy 
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deviation within the Democratic Party.  The modern theoretical framework that this thesis 
seeks to address finds definition in factionalism within political parties.  Despite early 
research that indicated a tendency towards factionalism among the dominant party in 
single-party dominated states (Key 1949; Hopper 1975; Canon 1978), a glance at the 
modern political atmosphere would appear to disagree.  The Republican Party remains 
startlingly united in policy if not in personality, even in states in which they find 
themselves firmly in the majority, while Democrats find themselves split along several 
policy fault lines. 
A possible explanation for this seeming paradox in the literature is the difference 
in the fundamental basis for each party.  Whereas the Republican Party is generally an 
“agent of an ideological movement whose supporters prize doctrinal purity”, the 
Democratic Party is more accurately seen as a collection of varied and disparate interest 
groups, all seeking to incite government action (Grossman and Hopkins 2015).   
Grossman and Hopkins further argue that the American people, while generally left-
leaning in terms of specific policy, simultaneously favor smaller government (ibid).  This 
divide between the more “ethereal” and more “concrete” policy desires of the American 
public offers a powerful context for the cohesion of the Republican Party in contrast to 
their Democratic colleagues.  When policy is seen as an ideology instead of a mere 
political direction, the purity tests applied to modern day politicians are much more easily 
understood. 
I argue, however, that, in states that are politically dominated by one or the other 
major party, candidates of the minority party that engage in policy deviation are less 
likely to suffer from a purity test.  As the minority party is starting each campaign from 
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an underdog position, the chance to win the election is often a more powerful factor than 
the desire for policy purity.  This is essentially the mirror argument made by Stone and 
Maisel (2003) that states that, in the case of a party that finds the partisan balance of a 
given district strongly against it, the party’s primary will be easier to win, as there is less 
quality competition for the nomination.  A party that is more heavily favored within a 
district will see greater competition within the primary, due to the strong likelihood of 
winning the general election.  This strong competition would likely see a more stringent 
application of such a purity test, to differentiate between several high quality candidates.   
I extrapolate from this argument that a minority candidate would likely be granted more 
room for policy divergence in the hopes that he could break the stranglehold of the 
historically majority party in the district.  This phenomenon can be seen in the example 
discussed in the first chapter, as Democratic candidate Travis Childers became the 
nominee despite multiple major deviations from the national Democratic Party platform.  
The fact that Childers was a quality candidate with previous Congressional experience 
offered enough incentive for Democratic voters and the state party to forgive his 
oppositional stances in favor of a mere chance at winning the Senate election. 
The cumulative effect of this purity requirement is to perpetuate and exacerbate 
the polarized atmosphere of the current Congress (Thomsen 2014).  Potential candidates 
who see themselves as “moderate” may not only see their chances of winning an election 
as extremely slim, but also their chances for leadership positions if they were to win.  
Both major parties have had a significant shift toward more starkly ideological leadership 
(Jessee and Malhotra 2010), increasing the likelihood of a purity test being applied to 
legislators seeking leadership positions.   
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Single-Party Dominated States 
Madison, in Federalist #10, expresses concern for the possibility of a single 
faction (or party, in the modern parlance) becoming so powerful as to subvert the desires 
of large populations of the United States in favor of their own goals (Hamilton and Jay 
2011).  Though it appears Madison was most occupied with the possibility of the poor 
rising up to redistribute the wealth and land of the privileged class, the idea of a political 
party wielding near-absolute influence and power is a modern day fear as well.  
The United States Congress has not been the only indicator of the modern era of 
hyper-polarization.  Over the last several decades, there has been an apparent realignment 
of partisanship among the states that comprise the Union, as well.  Entire regions of the 
country, in fact, have become indelibly associated with one of the two major parties in 
the American political system.  The average voter has an immediate assumption that a 
state located in the Deep South will be dominated by the Republican Party, and states 
along the north-east coast are typically bastions of the Democratic Party.  Very few states 
are left in which there is true competition among the parties. 
Is this assumption true?  Have single-party dominated states become the majority?  
Or is it simply a matter of optics, reinforced by stereotypical views of Republicans and 
Democrats and their supporters?  If it is true, is it unprecedented in modern times, or 
simply the result of cyclical forces, destined to ebb and flow?  In this era of partisan 
bickering, a thorough analysis of the individual states and their political flexibility could 
provide insight into the next few decades of political gamesmanship in the United States.  
If there truly are only a few states left that are in play during a Presidential election, the 
implications for campaigns and legislation could be massive.   
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What point is there in listening to the concerns of citizens in a single-party 
dominated state?  If a candidate is a member of the party they support, then he knows he 
has them in his corner and has little reason to spend time and energy there.  If they are 
aligned against his party, what would be gained by paying them any attention if they 
reliably vote in opposition?  Only a state who’s support is seen as attainable is worth the 
time and capital expenditure of active campaigning.  This possibly leaves a great deal of 
power in the hands of a very small number of states and, consequently, in the hands of a 
very small number of voters.  
If, however, this perception of states’ loyalties is only a myth, or if that loyalty 
can be broken over the course of two or three election cycles, the electoral math becomes 
a great deal more open.  There is a possibility that the “loyalty” of these states to a 
particular party is over-sold, and that the party dominance that is anecdotally observed is 
not nearly as ironclad as it appears.  Regardless, a thorough examination will reveal 
historic trends that can give better insight into the two party system in the United States. 
There is no single factor that explains political homogeneity in a state.  The 
phenomenon of single-party dominated states has been attributed to several variables, 
none of which offer a perfect predictor.  However, there are a few factors that explain a 
great deal of such polarization.  Each of these factors carries different weight in different 
regions, making a comprehensive ranking difficult to pin down.  The following factors 
are some of the most widely cited for contributing to political homogeneity (Knoke and 
Hout 1974; Franklin 1984; Jacoby 1988; McDaniel and Ellison 2008). 
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Religion 
Religion has long been seen as a powerful uniting force, and that certainly appears 
to be the case when it comes to American politics.  Studies have indicated that those who 
identify with more doctrinally orthodox religions or denominations are more likely to 
consider themselves Republicans, and that those with more liberal doctrinal beliefs 
gravitate towards the Democratic Party.  For instance, American Jews tend to vote for 
Democratic candidates by a wide margin (Cohen and Liebman 1997), and white 
American evangelical Christians are strongly in favor of the Republican Party (McDaniel 
and Ellison 2008). 
Much of this divide can be attributed to stances on “value” issues, and the 
emphasis placed on them by different religions and denominations (Langer 2005).  Many 
of the modern value issues that most clearly divide the two parties are either directly 
referenced or strongly alluded to in the sacred texts of the major religions represented in 
the United States.  Voters’ stances on abortion, same sex marriage, and, obviously, 
religious freedom and establishment issues such as prayer in school are all heavily 
influenced by interpretations of religious tenets, whether their own or those of their 
religious officials.  As both of the major parties have taken strong opposing stances 
regarding these issues during the last 30 years, a clear line has been drawn between the 
more orthodox religious voters and the more liberal religious voters.     
These religious attitudes toward voting are magnified by the tendency of people 
who share a religious denomination to concentrate geographically.  Pew research data 
shows a strong tendency of the major religious faiths and denominations to dominate 
certain states and, at times, certain regions (U.S. Religion Map and Religious 
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Populations).  Protestant evangelicalism throughout the southern states correlates strongly 
with Republican success in the region, just as the concentration of Jews in New York 
State is consistent with the advantage that Democrats typically enjoy there.  This 
religious concentration lends weight to the assertion that religious homogenization and 
party dominance are strongly related. 
Industry and the Rural/Urban Divide 
Prominent industry in a state or region plays a large role in political ideology as 
well.  Certain industries tend to be favored by one party or the other, and that favor is 
often returned by those who rely on those industries.  So too is the clear and striking 
divide between voters in rural areas and their urban counterparts (McKee 2008).   Though 
there is a certain level of endogeneity between the urban/rural variable and the others 
mentioned here, there is evidence that such an attribute figures heavily in voting 
decisions, especially since the 2004 election (McKee 2008).  
Farmers overwhelmingly vote for Republican candidates, so states that rely on 
agriculture, such as Mississippi and Nebraska tend to be reliably Republican.  This 
clearly re-enforces McKee’s argument of a conservative rural mindset.  Conversely, the 
strong relationship between the Democratic Party and organized labor has resulted in 
strong Democratic performance in states whose primary industries rely on organized 
labor, such as the automotive industry in Michigan.  Again, this dovetails with McKee 
and his analysis of urban environments. 
This relationship is obviously fluid, as such coalitions can change along with 
adjustments in party positions.  As the Democratic Party has begun to focus on promoting 
“clean” energy, Democrats have lost influence in states that rely on coal and oil.  As 
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legislative priorities shift within the parties, so too can the industries that back them, 
potentially putting previously single-party states back into play.   
Ethnicity 
In the previous section addressing religion, the qualification of “white” 
evangelical Christians is purposeful and deliberate.  Ethnicity is an important factor in 
voting behavior.  While whites have historically been fairly evenly divided between the 
two major parties, African-Americans overwhelmingly vote Democratic.  This is true 
across the United States, despite the domination of evangelical protestantism in the black 
community (Mangum 2008).  Additionally, industry and income seem to have little effect 
on this phenomenon.  African-Americans overwhelmingly vote Democratic.  Though 
there is no state in which African-Americans constitute a majority, the solid nature of 
their voting habits can have a dramatic impact on states that have other factors that favor 
Democrats. 
The same can be said for the Latino population.  Despite a generally conservative 
religious leaning, Latinos are predominantly supporters of the Democratic Party (Gibson 
and Hare 2012).  As the number of immigrants from Central and South American 
countries has grown, this factor has helped to solidify the Democratic control of 
California and has kept in play some states that otherwise would be solidly Republican 
(Barreto, et al 2008).  This apparent dissonance between racial and religious partisan 
tendencies provides a kind of mitigating circumstance regarding the polarization of states 
into single-party dominance.  A high concentration of evangelicals can be prevented from 
pulling the state to the political right if a large part of that population is made up of 
African-Americans and Latinos voting for Democratic candidates. 
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Polarization 
It has been suggested by Fiorina et al. (2008) that the impression of a polarized 
American public is largely a myth, and that it is only the party elites and candidates 
themselves who find the ideological extremes.  However, more recent research by 
Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) has found the polarization of the involved electorate 
has been growing at essentially the same rate.  As earlier discussed, this increased 
polarization of the electorate has fed the polarization of two parties. Whereas major 
disagreements between the Democrats and Republicans used to be relatively few and far 
between, contention has grown between the parties since the 1960’s, exemplified by such 
social issues as civil rights, abortion and welfare spending (Garner and Palmer 2011). 
This increased polarization of the two parties had the effect of marginalizing and 
even eliminating moderate voices within each party.  This becomes a self-perpetuating 
cycle, as the more extreme members of each party become more visible and less 
restrained, owing to the lack of cross-pressured members of their caucus (Fleisher and 
Bond 2004).  This observance can be extrapolated to the state level without significant 
changes.  As a state comes more under the control of a single political party, the 
controlling party finds less and less resistance to its more extreme policies, as there are 
fewer viable alternatives.  This acceptance of extremism fosters the continued domination 
of the state by a single party, as possible qualified candidates of the minority party see 
themselves more out of step with the mainstream voters of their constituency and do not 
enter the race (Abramowitz and Saunders 2005). 
This atmosphere, as previously discussed, discourages policy deviation by 
members of the majority party.  As there are likely to be many strong candidates willing 
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to enter the primary election, the purity test becomes more stringently applied.  While 
there are certainly circumstances that represent a forgivable policy deviation, party 
leadership is not likely to allow a consistent pattern of contrary voting, as will the 
offending candidate’s constituency.  However, this study will show that the purity test is 
a much less effective threat to a candidate of a minority party in a single-party dominated 
state.  With so little to lose, these candidates may in fact find party purity to be a stone 
around their neck. 
Sources of Policy Deviation 
This study makes no claims as to why candidates may seek to buck their national 
party’s platforms, only that it is more common to find such tendencies in minority party 
candidates campaigning in single-party dominated states.  To argue that political 
expedience is the only basis for defying party policy expectations is, obviously, foolish.  
Party loyalty is not the only influence exerted on candidates and legislators as regards 
their stances on issues.  Those who seek to represent a constituency in the Congress must 
strike a balance between their roles as delegates of the wishes of those they speak for and 
as trustees, leading from their own perspectives, knowledge, and values. 
It can be reasonably assumed that a candidate’s personal ideology will, generally 
speaking, align with those of the party with which he identifies (Levitt 1996).  After all, 
party identification is primarily based on an assessment of the perceived goals of the 
party as compared to one’s own.  However, it is rare that a national party, whose policies 
are composed by numerous individuals with input from dozens of interested parties, will 
align 100% with any single person.  In this circumstance, the personal values and beliefs 
of a candidate come to play a role.  Levitt assigns a great deal of importance to the 
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personal ideology of Representatives as it pertains to the votes they cast.  He finds that, 
particularly in districts that heavily favor their own party, Senators exhibit a strong 
pattern of voting in line with personal ideology.   
A recent example can be seen in Senator Mark Pryor (D-AR).  In 2013, Senator 
Pryor voted against an amendment that would expand background checks for purchasing 
firearms.  Despite polling that indicated a strong majority of his constituency supported 
the measure, the Senator explained his belief that the measure would have no measurable 
impact on gun crime (Miller 2013).  The Senator voted against the amendment based on 
his own personal ideology and beliefs concerning the legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
legislation.   
This same logic can be applied to candidates for office.  Those candidates who 
see distinct ideological differences between themselves and the party they identify with 
will sometimes express those differences during their campaigns.  However, as these 
candidates have more limited means and opportunities to explain these differences than 
those who already hold a seat, it is considerably more politically risky for them to do so.  
While incumbents have been found to vote often along the lines of their personal 
ideology, this only benefits a challenger if the voting public sees the challenger as more 
“in-step” than the incumbent (Hollibaugh et al. 2013).   Therefore, if a challenger 
deviates substantially from the party line, he loses any ability to exploit the deviations of 
the incumbent. 
Another powerful influence on voting behavior comes in the form of constituency 
influence.  Cohen and Fleisher (2006) focus on the difficulty faced by legislators in 
discerning between global political attitudes and specific attitudes as they pertain to the 
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constituency the legislators represent.  The authors find that specific issue attitudes of a 
legislator’s constituency held a great deal of weight when it came to the ultimate roll-call 
voting of the representative in question.  It stands to reason that these attitudes would 
have a similar effect on the campaign stances of challengers.  When a representative’s 
constituency holds policy opinions that strongly diverge from those of the 
representative’s party, that representative is likely to face enormous pressure from both 
party and people.  The same would hold true for any challenger seeking to unseat an 
incumbent. 
An easy example of such an issue comes in the form of immigration policy.  The 
national Democratic platform of 2008 expressed support for comprehensive immigration 
reform, as well as a plan to legalize those immigrants that had already come illegally to 
the country (Democratic Platform 2008).  However, a Democratic candidate involved in a 
tough race in a state with a generally conservative stance regarding immigration, such as 
Tom Udall of New Mexico, might find it expedient to temper their opinions or even 
assume positions more closely associated with the conservative Republican Party.   
For instance, during his 2008 campaign, Udall rejected the possibility of a path to 
legalization for undocumented immigrants during the 2008 campaign.  Considering its 
proximity to the border, New Mexico has a more immediate concern with illegal 
immigration than, say, Tennessee.  This regional concern and the strong opinions of the 
citizens of the state of New Mexico regarding immigration could logically pressure Udall 
to break with the Democratic Party on this issue to bolster his chances of winning the 
election.  These regionally important issues can be found all over the country, from the 
coal versus clean energy debate in Kentucky to military spending policy in states that 
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depend of military bases for tax revenue.  Each opens a window to possible policy 
deviation on the part of candidates. 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODS 
Single-Party Dominated States 
The first step to determining the effect the single-party domination of a state has 
on policy homogeneity is to determine which states are competitive and which are single-
party dominated in each election year.  For the purposes of this study, the data and 
methods of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) will be employed.  The 
NCSL combines the party identification of the Governor of a given state combined with 
the party holding a majority in each House of the state legislature.  If a majority in both 
Houses as well as the Governor identify with the same political party, the state is 
considered single-party dominated. 
This focus on state level offices offers a more appropriate view of state 
partisanship than focusing on more national indicators, such as the results of consecutive 
Presidential elections.  By using this measurement, two views of party competition are 
analyzed.  Within the state legislatures data, a more “micro” view of the voting 
tendencies of a state is discerned.  The relatively small districts that make up state 
legislatures provide context for the more “macro” view provided by the statewide voting 
that goes into selecting a governor.  This dual measurement prevents a small majority of 
citizens in a state creating the appearance of a strong party preference.  For instance, if 
the last three governors of Nevada had all been Republican, taking only that data into 
account would appear to show a strong allegiance to the Republican Party in that state.  
However, if each of those elections had been decided by less than three percentage 
points, it would be difficult to consider these results as particularly compelling.  
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Factoring in the dominance of each party within the upper and lower Houses of the state 
legislature goes a long way towards preventing such spurious assumptions. 
Some measures of state party competition include data reflecting the outcome of 
Presidential elections over time for each state.  While an argument for this inclusion can 
be made, for the purposes of this study it serves only to muddy the waters in the same 
way as taking only gubernatorial results into account.  This statewide measure is too 
susceptible to small majorities creating an inaccurate impression as to party competition.  
For instance, taking Presidential election results into account on the case of Mississippi 
would create the appearance of a consistently Republican dominated state.  However, 
until 2012, at least one House of the Mississippi legislature was controlled by Democrats, 
and a Democrat held the Governorship from 2000 until 2004.  This can hardly be seen as 
single party domination.  Additionally, as this thesis is studying the policy positions of 
Senate candidates, party preferences for state level offices are more applicable to such 
elections.  Voters often have different criteria for Presidential candidates than they do for 
Senate candidates.  A President is unlikely to make public statements regarding, or have a 
direct hand in affecting, local concerns, whereas a Senate candidate will be much more 
likely to include such issues in their campaign.  With this in mind, the inclusion of data 
regarding the assigning of each state’s electoral votes could well serve to skew the results 
of this study, and has therefore been rejected. 
With this formula in place, party competition in each state has been examined for 
the years 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014.  A nominal measurement was then assigned.  
If the state in question is not dominated politically by either party, the state is encoded as 
“0”.  If Democrats control both Houses of the legislature, as well as the governorship, the 
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state is encoded as “1”.  If the Republicans hold both Houses and the governorship, the 
state is encoded as a “2”. 
Policy Positions 
To compare the policy positions of each Senate candidate, a baseline must be 
established.  Many state branches of the national political parties have their own 
platforms that specifically address the concerns and issues facing the constituents of that 
state.  This obviously creates a patchwork of policy positions that is impossible to apply 
to all the candidates that self-identify under the umbrella of the national party. For this 
reason, using the platforms of each state is an unwieldy and unworkable option.  To 
establish the necessary policy baseline, the platforms of the national party organizations 
will be referenced.  Every two years, the national organizations representing the two 
parties publish a revised platform that specifically addresses the policies and positions 
favored by the party.  As the overarching authority regarding the goals and strategies of 
the two major parties, these documents present the clearest, most cohesive road maps that 
the parties as a whole intend to follow.  These national organizations also produce and 
reinforce the heurisitics associated with each party, as they play a major role in 
promoting candidates the party supports. 
In the case of the Democratic Party, the Democratic National Committee 
constitutes the national face of the party platform.  The national platforms they publish 
are archived at The American Presidency Project.  The Republican National Committee 
represents the policy of the GOP as a whole, and the platforms of the election years in 
question are archived on their page as well, at The American Presidency Project.  These 
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platforms will be used to establish the assumed policy positions of the Republican 
candidates. 
As previously mentioned, these platforms are not concrete.  Every four years, 
coinciding with Presidential election years, each party publishes a new platform.  These 
changes are usually iterative, for the most part, often refining and revising policy 
positions rather than making large, sweeping changes.  However, even relatively small 
changes in language can represent important distinctions, not only between the two 
parties, but also between the previous and currents goals and methods within the same 
party.  For this reason, each election year examined will have policy baselines drawn 
from the platform that was the most recently published at the time of the campaigns.  The 
campaigns examined that took place in 2006 will be compared to the national platforms 
published in 2004, while the campaigns that took place in 2008 and 2010 will both be 
compared to the platforms published during the run-up to the 2008 election. 
For each issue selected for observation, specific policy statements will be 
extricated from the parties’ national platforms.  The positions must be clear and precise, 
and present a concrete action or belief, such as statements that include phrases such as 
“we support”, “Democrats/Republicans condemn”, “we will work to” or “the Party 
intends to”.  General attitudes, such as “the Party believes in smaller government” will 
not be used as a baseline, as there is far too much subjectivity involved in quantifying 
candidates’ positions and policies.  However, the phrase “the Party believes in smaller 
government, and will work to reduce the number of federal agencies” is a specific path to 
accomplishing a general attitude.  It would therefore be considered for a baseline policy. 
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 Even within the highly polarized political atmosphere of the last decade, the two 
major political parties in the United States have a many positions in common.  Policies 
regarding terrorism and the treatment of military veterans are, for the most part, 
reasonably universal.  As these issues cause little disagreement between the two national 
parties, examining the expressed positions of the candidates for Senate regarding them 
provides no insight as to the effect of the political climate they find themselves in.  
Taking this into consideration, five policy areas have been chosen for this thesis that 
represent clear and significant policy divides between the two parties.  By choosing such 
controversial subjects, not only are the baseline policies of the parties more easily 
discerned, policy deviations will be more obvious. 
Second Amendment Rights   
Few policy areas engender as much rancorous dialogue as the limits or lack of 
limits that should be placed on the second amendment to the American Constitution.  
During recent decades, the Republican Party has become a nearly unqualified supporter 
of the belief that the right to own and carry a firearm is universal and inviolate.  In 
contrast, the Democratic Party has generally favored laws that would limit who can 
purchase a firearm, the maximum rate of fire a firearm is capable of, ammunition 
capacity, and the locations in which a firearm can be legally carried.  The obvious 
disconnect between the two platforms makes this issue an easy choice for observations.  
The specific positions that will be applied to the candidates observed are as follows: 
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Republican Platform, 2006  
o “We support efforts by the Administration and Congress to enhance the 
instant background check system for gun purchases and to ensure that 
records of lawful transactions are destroyed in a timely manner.” 
o “We applaud Congressional Republicans for seeking to stop frivolous 
lawsuits against firearms manufacturers, which is a transparent attempt to  
deprive citizens of their Second Amendment rights.”  
o “We oppose federal licensing of law- abiding gun owners and national 
gun registration as a violation of the Second Amendment and an 
invasion of privacy of honest citizens.”   
         
        (Republican Party Platforms 2004) 
    
Republican Platform, 2008-2010 
 
o “We urge immediate action to review the automatic denial of gun 
ownership to returning members of the Armed Forces who have suffered 
trauma during service to their country.”  
o “We condemn frivolous lawsuits against firearms manufacturers, which 
are transparent attempts to deprive citizens of their rights.”  
o “We oppose federal licensing of law-abiding gun owners and national gun 
registration as violations of the Second Amendment.”  
 
        (Republican Party Platforms 2008) 
  
Democratic Platform, 2006 
 
o “We will protect Americans' Second Amendment right to own firearms, 
and we will keep guns out of the hands of criminals and terrorists by 
fighting gun crime, reauthorizing the assault weapons ban, and closing the 
gun show loophole, as President Bush proposed and failed to do.” 
 
        (Democratic Party Platforms 2004) 
 
Democratic Platform, 2008-2010 
 
o “We believe that the right to own firearms is subject to reasonable 
regulation, but we know that what works in Chicago may not work in 
Cheyenne.” 
o “We can work together to enact and enforce commonsense laws and 
improvements – like closing the gun show loophole, improving our 
background check system, and reinstating the assault weapons ban…” 
 
        (Democratic Party Platforms 2008) 
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Immigration 
Though both parties express fondness for legal immigrants and the contributions 
they make to the United States, they express completely different attitudes when it comes 
to the proper methods for dealing with the influx of undocumented immigrants that has 
occurred in recent years.  The Republican Party has generally presented plans that focus 
on deportation and restriction of benefits for undocumented immigrants.  The Democratic 
Party has taken a less stark position, indicating a willingness to work with undocumented 
immigrants and a desire to bring them out of hiding.  The specific positions regarding 
immigration that will be examined are: 
Republican Platform, 2006 
o “A growing economy requires a growing number of workers, and 
President Bush has proposed a new temporary worker program that 
applies when no Americans can be found to fill the jobs. This new 
program would allow workers who currently hold jobs to come out of the 
shadows and to participate legally in America’s economy.”  
o “We oppose amnesty because it would have the effect of encouraging 
illegal immigration and would give an unfair advantage to those who have 
broken our laws.” 
 
        (Republican Party Platforms 2004) 
 
Republican Platform, 2008-2010 
o “Our determination to uphold the rule of law beginswith more effective 
enforcement, giving our agents the tools and resources they need to protect 
our sovereignty, completing the border fence quickly and securing the 
borders…”  
o “We oppose amnesty.” 
o “A phased in requirement that employers use the E-Verify system must be 
enacted. “ 
 
 
 
o “…nor does it mean that illegal aliens should receive social security 
benefits, or other public benefits…”  
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o “We support English as the official language in our nation…” 
 
        (Republican Party Platforms 2008) 
 
  
Democratic Platform, 2006 
o “Undocumented immigrants within our borders who clear a background 
check, work hard and pay taxes should have a path to earn full 
participation in America.” 
o “As we undertake these steps, we will work with our neighbors to 
strengthen our security so we are safer from those who would come here 
to harm us.” 
 
        (Democratic Party Platforms 2004) 
  
Democratic Platform, 2008-2010 
o “We need comprehensive immigration reform, not just piecemeal efforts.” 
o “We also need to do more to promote economic development in migrant-
sending nations, to reduce incentives to come to the United States 
illegally.” 
o “For the millions living here illegally but otherwise playing by the rules, 
we must require them to come out of the shadows and get right with the 
law. We support a system that requires undocumented immigrants who are 
in good standing to pay a fine, pay taxes, learn English, and go to the back 
of the line for the opportunity to become citizens.” 
o “…we will increase the number of immigration visas for family members 
of people living here and for immigrants who meet the demand for jobs 
that employers cannot fill…” 
 
        (Democratic Party Platforms 2008) 
 
Environmental Policy 
Another clear divide that has emerged between the two parties centers around the 
balancing of environmental protection and the free market.  While both parties espouse 
commitment to protecting the environment as well as promoting American businesses, 
the policies that each supports provide another undeniable schism.  Republicans are 
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widely seen as choosing business over environmental concerns, both in their enthusiasm 
for oil exploration and with their limited focus on climate change and its effect on the 
planet.  Democrats, on the other hand, are often seen as strongly supporting pro-
environment policy, often to the detriment of businesses.  The specific quotes from the 
two parties’ platforms that will constitute the baseline for this policy area are: 
Republican Platform, 2006 
o “Our President and our Party strongly oppose the Kyoto Protocol and 
similar mandatory carbon emissions controls that harm economic growth 
and destroy American jobs.”  
o “Our Party continues to support energy development in the coastal plain of 
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR)…”  
o “We believe nuclear power can help reduce our dependence on foreign 
energy and play an invaluable role in addressing global climate change.”  
o “Republicans are committed to meeting the challenge of long-term global 
climate change by relying on markets and new technologies to improve 
energy efficiency.” 
 
        (Republican Party Platforms 2004) 
 
Republican Platform, 2008-2010 
o “We support accelerated exploration, drilling and development in 
America, from new oilfields off the nation’s coasts to onshore fields such 
as those in Montana, North Dakota, and Alaska.”  
o “As part of a global climate change strategy, Republicans support 
technology-driven, market-based solutions that will decrease emissions…” 
o “In addition, the public should have access to public lands for recreational 
activities such as hunting, hiking, and fishing.” 
 
        (Republican Party Platforms 2008) 
  
Democratic Platform, 2006 
o “We will reduce mercury emissions, smog and acid rain, and will address 
the challenge of climate change with the seriousness of purpose this great 
challenge demands.” 
o “We support balanced development of domestic oil supplies in areas 
already open for exploration, like the western and central Gulf of 
Mexico.” 
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o “We support tax credits for private sector investment in clean, renewable 
sources of energy, and we will make ethanol credits work better for 
farmers.” 
 
        (Democratic Party Platforms 2004) 
  
Democratic Platform, 2008-2010 
o “We will implement a market-based cap and trade system to reduce 
carbon emissions by the amount scientists say is necessary to avoid 
catastrophic change and we will set interim targets along the way to ensure 
that we meet our goal.” 
o “We will make it a top priority to reduce oil consumption by at least 35 
percent, or ten million barrels per day, by 2030.” 
o “And this is how we'll solve the problem of four-dollar-a-gallon gas— 
with a comprehensive plan and investment in clean energy.” 
 
        (Democratic Party Platforms, 2008) 
 
Marriage Equality 
As Evangelical Christians have become one of the most reliable voting blocs for 
the Republican Party, the GOP has not wavered significantly in their position regarding 
same-sex marriage in the United States.  The calls for a Constitutional amendment to ban 
gay marriage and/or define marriage as a union between one man and one woman have 
been a constant feature of GOP platforms since the late 1990’s.  The Democratic Party, 
however, has evolved its positions from one that simply wanted marriage to remain 
defined at the state level, to calling for an end to the Federal ban on same-sex marriage 
(the Defense of Marriage Act, or DOMA) and that homosexuals be afforded the same 
benefits and protections as heterosexuals. 
Though data shows that the American public as a whole have become more 
accepting of same-sex marriage, the policies of the two parties have remained at odds for  
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some time, and are often couched in terms of “morality” and “values”.  The specific 
platform policies that will be examined are: 
 Republican Platform, 2006 
o “After more than two centuries of American jurisprudence, and millennia 
of human experience, a few judges and local authorities are presuming to 
change the most fundamental institution of civilization, the union of a man 
and a woman in marriage. Attempts to redefine marriage in a single state 
or city could have serious consequences throughout the country, and 
anything less than a Constitutional amendment, passed by the Congress 
and ratified by the states, is vulnerable to being overturned by activist 
judges.”  
o “President Bush will also vigorously defend the Defense of Marriage Act, 
which was supported by both parties and passed by 85 votes in the Senate. 
This common sense law reaffirms the right of states not to recognize 
same-sex marriages licensed in other states.” 
 
        (Republican Party Platforms 2004) 
  
Republican Platform, 2008-2010 
o “…we call for a constitutional amendment that fully protects marriage as a 
union of a man and a woman, so that judges cannot make other 
arrangements equivalent to it.” 
o “A Republican Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act, affirming 
the right of states not to recognize same-sex marriage licensed in other 
states. Unbelievably, the Democratic Party has now pledged to repeal the 
Defense of Marriage Act, which would subject every state to the 
redefinition of marriage by a judge without ever allowing the people to 
vote on the matter.” 
 
        (Republican Party Platforms 2008) 
Democratic Platform, 2006 
o “We support full inclusion of gay and lesbian families in the life of our 
nation and seek equal responsibilities, benefits, and protections for these 
families. In our country, marriage has been defined at the state level for 
200 years, and we believe it should continue to be defined there. We 
repudiate President Bush's divisive effort to politicize the Constitution by 
pursuing a ‘Federal Marriage Amendment.’” 
         
        (Democratic Party Platforms 2004) 
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Democratic Platform, 2008-2010 
o “We oppose the Defense of Marriage Act and all attempts to use this issue 
to divide us.” 
o “We support the full inclusion of all families, including same-sex couples, 
in the life of our nation, and support equal responsibility, benefits, and 
protections.” 
 
        (Democratic Party Platforms 2008) 
 
Abortion 
Since the rise of the religious right as a core voting bloc in the 1980’s, Republican 
and Democratic Presidents and legislators have been locked in battle over its 
implementation.  Republicans have often sought to limit the circumstances under which a 
woman can obtain an abortion, and completely overturn Roe in its entirety.  Democrats 
have vocally resisted allowing any limitations to be imposed on the procedure, arguing 
that restricting the right of a woman to make a private medical decision is paramount.  
Within this divide, little has changed but the methods employed to achieve each side’s 
desired outcome. 
The policy stances of each party that will be examined are as follows: 
Republican Platform, 2006 
o “…we support protecting the rights of families in international programs 
and oppose funding organizations involved in abortion. “ 
o “We support the appointment of judges who respect traditional family 
values and the sanctity of innocent human life.”  
o “We join the President in supporting crisis pregnancy programs and 
parental notification laws. And we applaud President Bush for allowing 
states to extend health care coverage to unborn children.”  
o “We strongly support the President’s policy that prevents taxpayer dollars 
from being used to encourage the future destruction of human embryos.” 
 
        (Republican Party Platforms 2004) 
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Republican Platform, 2008-2010 
o “We assert the rights of families in all international programs and will not 
fund organizations involved in abortion. We strongly support the long-
held policy of the Republican Party known as the ‘Mexico City policy’, 
which prohibits federal monies from being given to non-governmental 
organizations that provide abortions or actively promote abortion as a 
method of family planning in other countries.”  
o “We lament that judges have denied the people their right to set abortion 
policies in the states and are undermining traditional marriage laws from 
coast to coast.” 
o “Because the family is our basic unit of society, we fully support parental 
rights to consent to medical treatment for their children including mental 
health treatment, drug treatment, alcohol treatment, and treatment 
involving pregnancy, contraceptives and abortion.”  
  
        (Republican Party Platforms 2008) 
Democratic Platform, 2006 
o “Because we believe in the privacy and equality of women, we stand 
proudly for a woman's right to choose, consistent with Roe v. Wade, 
and regardless of her ability to pay. We stand firmly against 
Republican efforts to undermine that right.” 
 
        (Democratic Party Platforms 2004) 
 
 
 
 
Democratic Platform, 2008-2010 
o “The Democratic Party strongly and unequivocally supports Roe v. Wade 
and a woman's right to choose a safe and legal abortion, regardless of 
ability to pay, and we oppose any and all efforts to weaken or undermine 
that right.” 
 
        (Democratic Party Platforms 2008) 
 
 
These policy statements from the national platforms of the two major United 
States political parties serve as the “control,” or baseline policy platforms for the 
candidates that were investigated.  They are concrete, quantifiable statements of purpose 
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and direction that can then be sought within the policy positions taken by the candidates 
during their campaigns, making them ideal for a basis of comparison between the 
national party and the individual would-be legislators. 
Candidate Policy Analysis 
To ascertain how closely candidates adhered to the national message of their 
respective party over time, the election years of 2006, 2008, and 2010 will be examined.  
For each of these years, the Republican and Democratic candidates for Senate in each of 
the 50 states were studied.  
Gathering and interpreting the policy stances of candidates for the United States 
Senate presents several challenges.  The first is, ironically, the wealth of available sources 
from which to collect quotes and literature regarding candidate’s policies.  The problems 
that arise from such a banquet are two-fold: the implementation of such data, and the 
providence of the information.  To combat these issues, restrictions must be placed on the 
sources and timing of the expressed policy positions. 
To ensure that the positions attributed to the candidates are applicable to the 
election year being examined, a time limit must be imposed.  This makes a certain 
amount of subjectivity unavoidable, as the line must be draw at some point.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, the line for statements of policy for challengers to be included is 
drawn at two years prior to the day of that year’s election.  As many campaigns actually 
begin before a candidate officially enters a race, the final third of a given Senate term 
offers a reasonable span of time to include positions expressed by challengers that may 
predate their actual entry into the electoral contest.  If, however, the challenger was 
previously a member of a legislative body (such as a state senator) and has a record of 
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votes that is applicable to the issue in question, that record will be treated with the same 
rules as a United States Senate incumbent, as addressed in the following section. 
For incumbents, the line must be blurred a bit further.  An incumbent candidate 
must run not only on the statements made during the actual election in question, but also 
on the record that Representative has accrued during their time in office.  As a challenger 
is almost guaranteed to challenge the incumbent on his record of legislating, this record 
must be considered when compiling policy positions.  While current statements of policy 
supersede previous roll-call votes or previous policy stances, if an incumbent does not 
address one of the previously mentioned issues within actual campaign literature or 
speeches, the record he or she has previously accrued on such subjects will be used to 
determine adherence to or deviation from national party policy.  For instance, if a 
hypothetical Democratic Senate incumbent voted in favor of a constitutional ban on 
same-sex marriage in 2005, but does not mention it during their 2006 reelection 
campaign, the vote will be scored as a deviation from the national Democratic platform.  
If, however, they voted in favor of the ban in 2005, but then campaign on a position of 
rejecting such a ban, the later policy position will be the one assigned to that candidate 
for the purpose of this study.  The same rules will apply to conflicting votes if the 
candidate has offered no clarification of their position since the latest vote.  If two votes 
indicate a conflicting position on an issue in question, the later vote will be recorded as 
the Representative’s campaign position. 
Even more challenging than the issue of a policy position’s proximity to the 
actual campaign is the issue of providence.  While the technological age in which we live 
has given the public unprecedented access to records and quotes of candidates, it also 
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increases the chances of misrepresentation of those records and quotes, whether 
malicious or unintended.  A candidate’s expression of support for a woman’s right to 
choose in certain trimesters can be characterized by his opponent or the press as “support 
for abortion”, full stop.  The candidate’s actual quote would therefore be a slight 
deviation from the national Democratic position, but the position attributed to him by his 
challenger would seem to align the candidate perfectly to the national Democratic 
platform. 
To combat this challenge, only two sources for each candidate have been 
examined to seek out policy positions.  The primary source is the candidate’s campaign 
website.  Challengers and incumbents alike have increasingly turned to the internet to 
help promote their messages and policy positions to the public.  The Library of Congress 
has created and maintained an archived database of these campaign pages that spans each 
election year from 2000 to 2010 (Library of Congress).  Each candidate’s entire website 
was examined to glean any positions expressed therein that applied to those policy areas 
in question.   
In the event that any of the policy areas being examined were not addressed 
within the candidate’s official campaign website, the non-partisan policy website “On 
The Issues” (ontheissues.org) was consulted.  The site catalogues not only the statements 
made on official campaign websites for each and every candidate, but previous role-call 
votes of incumbents, as well as public statements made in interviews and speeches.  Each 
entry is linked to source material for verification of authenticity.  If a policy area was not 
addressed on either of these two sites, that policy area was omitted from that candidate’s 
entry, and was not factored into their average partisan score. 
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It is not expected, in this modern age of candidate-centered elections, for an 
individual candidate to parrot, word for word, the position of the national party to which 
they belong.  Again, this introduces a certain level of subjectivity to these measurements 
that is unavoidable.  If a candidate’s national party is on record supporting “reasonable” 
regulation of the right to carry a firearm, the candidate’s statements regarding such 
regulation must be examined with a reasonable amount of subjectivity.  For instance, if a 
candidate says they support a longer waiting period to obtain a handgun, the language 
may not be the same as the national policy, but an extension of a waiting period can be 
interpreted as a “reasonable” regulation and would therefore be coded as a policy 
consistent with the national platform. 
Once a candidate’s campaign policy position was determined, it was compared to 
the specific national platform agenda items listed previously.  Each policy section was 
scored on a scale from 0 to 4, indicating where on the partisan spectrum they fell for each 
policy area.  The scores represent the following alignments:  
Score of 0: Strong adherence to the Democratic national platform.  No 
deviations from Democratic national platform policies. 
 
Score of .5: Strong adherence to the Democratic national platform.  Minor 
deviation from Democratic national platform policies. 
 
Score of 1: Weak adherence to the Democratic national platform.  Multiple 
minor deviations or a major deviation from Democratic national platform 
policies. 
 
Score of 1.5: Weak adherence to the Democratic national platform.  Several 
minor and major deviations from Democratic national platform. 
 
Score of 2: Independent or centrist policies that do not significantly adhere to 
either national party platform. 
 
Score of 2.5: Weak adherence to the Republican national platform.  Several 
minor and major deviations from Republican national platform. 
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Score of 3: Weak adherence to the Republican national platform.  Multiple 
minor deviations or a major deviation from Republican national platform 
policies. 
 
Score of 3.5: Strong adherence to the Republican national platform.  Minor 
deviation from Republican national platform policies. 
 
Score of 4: Strong adherence to the Republican national platform.  No 
deviations from Republican national platform policies. 
 
To be scored as a “0” or “4” a candidate needn’t express support for every part of 
the national platform being considered.  If a candidate actively supports most of the 
examined policy priorities without offering any contradictory policy priorities, they were 
scored as a “0” or “4”.  Once the five scores for each candidate were assigned, they were 
averaged to find each candidate’s overall position on the partisan spectrum.  This is the 
score that was used to determine and compare the level of policy deviation that occurred 
in single-party dominated states as opposed to competitive states.   
 Control variables were added to account for other factors affecting policy 
deviation.  These include the gender of the candidate, which was assigned a nominal 
value of “0” for female candidates and “1” for males. Candidates were also assigned a 
nominal value for their status as a challenger or incumbent.  Challengers were coded as a 
“0”, incumbents as a “1”. The percentage of each state’s population that lived in urban 
areas was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau (census.gov), and was assigned to the 
candidates in each state using a ratio measurement. Finally, the percentage of citizens of 
each state that identified as evangelical Christians was obtained from the Association of 
Religious Data Archives, and assigned to the candidates using a ratio measurement. 
(thearda.com).  These variables are included to ensure that the results are representative 
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of the actual causes of policy deviation, and not just a spurious connection.  My 
hypotheses are as follows. 
 H1: United States Senate candidates running in states that that are dominated by   
 their own political party will adhere more closely to their national Party’s policy      
 platform than those in competitive states. 
 H2: United States Senate candidates running in states that that are dominated by the 
 opposing political party will adhere more closely to the opposing Party’s policy 
 platform than those in competitive states. 
 H3: United States Senate candidates running in states that that are dominated by 
 their own political party will adhere more closely to their national Party’s policy 
 platform than those in states controlled by the opposing party. 
 H4: United States Senate candidates running in states that that are dominated by the 
 opposing political party will adhere more closely to the opposing party’s policy 
 platform than those in states controlled by their own party. 
 H5: In all cases, Republican candidates will exhibit more consistent adherence to the 
 national Republican Party’s policy platform than will Democratic candidates. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
According to the NCSL formula for determining party competition by state, the 
number of single-party dominated states is easily discovered.  In 2006, 27 states fit the 
criteria for single-party domination (Table 1).  Unexpectedly, many states that would 
typically be associated with Republican dominance are, in fact, competitive or even 
controlled by the Democratic Party when evaluated by the NCSL measurements.  States 
such as Mississippi, Alabama, and Tennessee all evidence split control of state 
government.  Louisiana, though firmly positioned within the Deep South, and steeped in 
conservative Evangelical Protestant and Catholic traditions, was dominated by the 
Democratic Party.  Additionally, the state of Texas was found to be firmly within the 
control of the Republican Party, despite a similar religious makeup as Louisiana and a 
much larger Latino population, per capita.  Similarly, states that are widely seen as 
Democratic strongholds, such as California and Rhode Island, were found to be 
competitive as well. 
These unexpected results seem to put the literature regarding racial minorities and 
religious traditions and their effect on political homogeneity into perspective.  Though 
such variables may have a powerful effect on a state’s political leanings, they are far from 
the only deciding factors.  The years 2008 and 2010 feature similar patterns, though the 
number of single-party dominated states rises, as expected.  In 2006, ten states were 
dominated by the Republican Party and 17 states were dominated by the Democratic 
Party, with 23 states having mixed or competitive state governments.   
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Table 1  
Distribution of Party Competition in 2006 
State 
2006 Party Control Of State Government 
      Legislature                       Governor Competition Level 
AL D R Competitive 
AK R R SPD (R) 
AZ R D Competitive 
AR D D SPD (D) 
CA D R Competitive 
CO D D SPD (D) 
CT D R Competitive 
DE SPLIT D Competitive 
FL R R SPD (R) 
GA R R SPD (R) 
HI D R Competitive 
ID R R SPD (R) 
IL D D SPD (D) 
IN SPLIT R Competitive 
IA D D SPD (D) 
KS R D Competitive 
KY SPLIT R Competitive 
LA D D SPD (D) 
ME D D SPD (D) 
MD D D SPD (D) 
MA D D SPD (D) 
MI SPLIT D Competitive 
MN D R Competitive 
MS D R Competitive 
MO R R SPD (R) 
MT SPLIT D Competitive 
NE N/A R Competitive 
NV D R Competitive 
NH D D SPD (D) 
NJ D D SPD (D) 
NM D D SPD (D) 
NY D D SPD (D) 
NC D D SPD (D) 
ND R R SPD (R) 
OH SPLIT D Competitive 
OK R D Competitive 
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Table 1 (continued). 
 
OR D D SPD (D) 
PA SPLIT D Competitive 
RI D R Competitive 
SC R R SPD (R) 
SD R R SPD (R) 
TN R D Competitive 
TX R R SPD (R) 
UT R R SPD (R) 
VT D R Competitive 
VA SPLIT D Competitive 
WA D D SPD (D) 
WV D D SPD (D) 
WI D D SPD (D) 
WY R D Competitive 
Total Single Party 
Dominated States 
  27 
 
The data show only a slight increase in the net number of single-party dominated 
states, from 27 in 2006 to 28 such states in 2008 (Table 2).  The interesting results come 
from a closer look at how that increase came about.  In 2008, Democrats lost control of 
Louisiana, as it became competitive after electing a Republican governor, while gaining 
control of Delaware, for no net change in the number of states controlled.  The 
Republican Party, however, gained control of Arizona and Kansas as they took control of 
the governorship of both states, while losing only Alaska when that state’s legislature  
split, boosting their total number of controlled states to 11.  This shift began a  
consolidation of state level power within the Republican Party that would continue in  
2010. 
In 2010, the number of single-party controlled states dropped (Table 3).  The 
Republican Party lost control of Kansas and Missouri when those states elected  
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Table 2 
Distribution of Party Competition in 2008 
State 
2008 Party Control Of State Government 
      Legislature                       Governor Competition Level 
AL D R Competitive 
AK SPLIT R Competitive 
AZ R R SPD (R) 
AR D D SPD (D) 
CA D R Competitive 
CO D D SPD (D) 
CT D R Competitive 
DE D D SPD (D) 
FL R R SPD (R) 
GA R R SPD (R) 
HI D R Competitive 
ID R R SPD (R) 
IL D D SPD (D) 
IN SPLIT R Competitive 
IA D D SPD (D) 
KS R R SPD (R) 
KY SPLIT R Competitive 
LA D R Competitive 
ME D D SPD (D) 
MD D D SPD (D) 
MA D D SPD (D) 
MI SPLIT D Competitive 
MN D R Competitive 
MS D R Competitive 
MO R R SPD (R) 
MT SPLIT D Competitive 
NE N/A R Competitive 
NV D R Competitive 
NH D D SPD (D) 
NJ D D SPD (D) 
NM D D SPD (D) 
NY D D SPD (D) 
NC D D SPD (D) 
ND R R SPD (R) 
OH SPLIT D Competitive 
OK R D Competitive 
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Table 2 (continued). 
 
OR D D SPD (D) 
PA SPLIT D Competitive 
RI D R Competitive 
SC R R SPD (R) 
SD R R SPD (R) 
TN R D Competitive 
TX R R SPD (R) 
UT R R SPD (R) 
VT D R Competitive 
VA SPLIT D Competitive 
WA D D SPD (D) 
WV D D SPD (D) 
WI D D SPD (D) 
WY R D Competitive 
Total Single Party 
Dominated States 
  28 
 
Democratic governors, while gaining control of no other states.  The Democratic Party 
lost control of New Jersey when they lost that state’s governorship to Republican Chris  
Christy resulting in a net loss of three single-party dominated states.  With these three 
states moving into the “competitive” category, the total number of single-party dominated 
states dropped to 25. 
Though the individual candidates from the years 2012 and 2014 were not studied 
for this thesis due to a lack of time and resources, the data regarding party competition 
for those years was compiled and analyzed.  2012 showed an impressive jump in the 
number of single-party dominated states.  The Republican Party took control of Alaska,  
Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Wisconsin and Wyoming, while losing control of none, for a  
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Table 3 
Distribution of Party Competition in 2010 
State 
2010 Party Control Of State Government 
      Legislature                       Governor Competition Level 
AL D R Competitive 
AK SPLIT R Competitive 
AZ R R SPD (R) 
AR D D SPD (D) 
CA D R Competitive 
CO D D SPD (D) 
CT D R Competitive 
DE D D SPD (D) 
FL R R SPD (R) 
GA R R SPD (R) 
HI D R Competitive 
ID R R SPD (R) 
IL D D SPD (D) 
IN SPLIT R Competitive 
IA D D SPD (D) 
KS R D Competitive 
KY SPLIT R Competitive 
LA D R Competitive 
ME D D SPD (D) 
MD D D SPD (D) 
MA D D SPD (D) 
MI SPLIT D Competitive 
MN D R Competitive 
MS D R Competitive 
MO R d Competitive 
MT SPLIT D Competitive 
NE N/A R Competitive 
NV D R Competitive 
NH D D SPD (D) 
NJ D R Competitive 
NM D D SPD (D) 
NY D D SPD (D) 
NC D D SPD (D) 
ND R R SPD (R) 
OH SPLIT D Competitive 
OK R D Competitive 
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Table 3 (continued). 
 
OR D D SPD (D) 
PA SPLIT D Competitive 
RI D R Competitive 
SC R R SPD (R) 
SD R R SPD (R) 
TN R D Competitive 
TX R R SPD (R) 
UT R R SPD (R) 
VT D R Competitive 
VA SPLIT D Competitive 
WA D D SPD (D) 
WV D D SPD (D) 
WI D D SPD (D) 
WY R D Competitive 
Total Single Party 
Dominated States 
  25 
 
gain of 14 states.  The Democrats, however, gained control over only California, 
Connecticut, Minnesota, and Vermont, while losing Arizona, Iowa, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, New York, and Wisconsin, for a total of 2 states lost.  In all, only 12 states 
remained competitive by the NCSL’s measurements.  In 2014, the total number of single-
party dominated states remained static, with the Democratic Party taking control of New 
York and Rhode Island, and Maine and Missouri becoming competitive. 
This explosion in the number of single-party dominated states coincides with the 
rise of the Tea Party as a political powerhouse in the United States.  Though it would be 
unwise to attribute all the credit for this shift to one group in the world of American 
politics, it seems unlikely that the rise in prominence of a hyper-conservative wing of the 
Republican Party and the evident domination of state level politics by the Republicans 
would be a total coincidence. 
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National Party Policy Deviation 
After analyzing the individual candidates’ data, a definite pattern emerged.  In 
2006, Democratic candidates for Senate in states that were not politically dominated by 
one party or the other scored anywhere from a perfect 0 to 3.3 on the partisan scale with a 
median score of 1.16.  In states dominated by their own Democratic Party, the candidates 
ranged from 0 to 2.2, with the median falling at .655.  Finally, in Republican dominated 
states, Democratic candidates scored in a range from .6 to 1.87, with a median score of -
.96.  Taken at these values, there does not appear to be much deviation, with means 
remaining firmly within the “Democratic” side of the partisan line. 
However, when the three sets of data are viewed together as box plots, the real 
difference can be easily seen.  As evidenced by the box plot for 2006 (Figure 1), 
Democratic candidates in states that were dominated by the Republican Party have a 
strikingly less Democratic low score of .6, measurably higher than Democrats running in 
the competitive or Democrat dominated states.  Furthermore, the scores of these 
Democratic candidates clustered clearly higher (or “more Republican”) than those in the 
states dominated by their own party, supporting H2 and H4. H1 is also supported, as the 
Democratic candidates saw clustering further into the “Democratic” side of the partisan 
line in states controlled by their own party than in competitive states.  
In the case of Republican Senate candidates in the 2006 election, the results are 
even more interesting.  In competitive states, Republican candidates received scores 
ranging from .3 to a perfect 4 with a median score of 3.04. This places half of the 
candidates in these states above a 3.04 score, indicating a very strong adherence to the 
Republican national platform.  However, in states that were dominated by their own 
  
 
Figure 1. Average Partisan Scores 2006
party, the scores never come close to crossing the line into “Democratic” scores.  With a 
low score of 3.4, a high score of a perfect 
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Figure 2. Average Partisan Scores 2008
of .2 to a perfect 4, with a median of 3.  Again, the first and second quartiles cluster at a 
more “Democratic” level along the partisan line, indicating support for H
patterns repeat in 2008 (Figure 2
never achieve a partisan score lower than 
reach in the other two categories of states.  They also reach a top score of a perfectly 
“Republican” 4 in Republican controlled states, while never scoring higher than 
elsewhere.  Also, the box plots show clustering at higher scores in Republican states than 
in any others.  This indicates a clear tendency for policy deviation among Democratic 
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candidates to be more frequent and more extreme when running in solidly Republican 
states.  Once again, all hypotheses are supported by these findings. 
The Republican candidates show an even greater tendency to remain adherent to 
their national Party platform in 2008.  Indeed, only a single Republican candidate 
(Senator Susan Collins of Maine) skewed into the “Democratic” side of the partisan line 
The median score for each category never drops below a 3.35.  Though the data does 
show clustering at lower scores in states controlled by Democrats, the fact that this 
clustering is still solidly within “Republican” score territory is telling, and lends support 
for all hypotheses.  
Again, Republican candidates remain committed to the national Party platform to 
a much greater degree than do Democratic candidates, even in states in which they face 
unfavorable odds, supporting H5.  While Democrats were shown to be willing to move 
into the more conservative side of the partisan scale in both Republican and 
Democratically controlled states, only two Republican candidates found their average 
scores crossing that line, and both constitute statistical outliers. Finally, in 2010 (Figure 
3), Democratic candidates in competitive states received scores ranging from a perfect 0 
to a perfect 4, with a median score of 1.06. 
In states controlled by the Democratic Party, Democrats still had wide ranging 
scores, from 0 to 3.75.  With the two outliers removed, scores ranged from -2 to -.5.  
Finally, in those states controlled by Republicans, Democrats scored between 0 and 3, 
with no statistical outliers.  Fully 25% of Democratic candidates scored 0 or higher in 
Republican states, a surprisingly high portion of the population.  These results support all 
hypotheses, in the case of Democratic candidates in 2010. 
  
   
Figure 3. Average Partisan Scores 2010
Once again, party cohesion was much stronger within the Republican Party.  
Candidates running in competitive states never dropped below a score of 2.66, with 9 of 
the 16 candidates scoring a perfect 4.  In Republican controlled state
candidates ranged from 2.6 to a perfect 4, with a median score of 3.68.  
controlled by the Democratic Party, scores ranged from 
score of 3.63.  Fully 25% of candidates scored between 
tendency for policy deviation as compared with Republican and competitive states.  
However, only a single candidate scored in the “Democratic” range.  Nearly all 
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hypotheses are once again supported.  However, in this case, there is some dissonance.  
In 2010, Republican candidates in Republican dominated states actually had a slightly 
more “Democratic” low score than those in competitive states.  Additionally, the median 
score was just slightly lower in Republican controlled states at 3.68, as opposed to the 
median score of a perfect 4 in competitive states.  So, in the case of Republican 
candidates in the 2010 election, H1 is not supported. 
While the support of these hypotheses seems on its face to be significant, once 
control variables are introduced to the model, the significance of the party competition 
variable is seriously reduced (Table 4).  When the regression is controlled for the 
variables mentioned in the second chapter, single-party domination loses all significance.  
The more fascinating outcomes arise from the variables that do show significance. 
For instance, the classification of a candidate as a challenger rather than an 
incumbent was found to be significant at the .01 level.  This indicates that incumbent 
candidates are more likely to deviate from national policy platforms than challengers.  As 
addressed in the second chapter, this is likely due to several factors, including the safety 
associated with the incumbency advantage and the tendency of challengers to attack 
incumbents from their partisan extreme.  For instance, Tea Party backed candidate 
Jonathan Karl defeated the powerful Republican incumbent Eric Cantor by attacking him 
from his conservative flank on the issue of immigration.  The aforementioned desire for 
party purity likely leads challengers to remain wedded to the national party platform as a 
method of subverting the incumbency advantage. 
   
 
  
56
 
Table 4 
Regression Results 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .1, .05, and .01 significance levels 
 
 Additionally, the party identification of a candidate was also found to be 
significant at the .01 level.  Candidates that identify as Democrats were found to be more 
likely to deviate from party policy.  This provides evidence to support H5, as well as 
Grossman and Hopkins’ (2015) data that shows a greater tendency towards policy 
cohesion among Republicans.  This begs the question, is this a modern phenomenon 
exacerbated by the Tea Party, or does Grossman and Hopkins’ theory apply to 
Republicans of earlier time periods as well?  This would benefit from further research, 
 COEFFICIENTS 
VARIABLES        Model 1 
  
Single Party 0.112 
 (1.27) 
Incumbent -0.377 
 (3.08)*** 
Party ID -0.476 
 (3.94)*** 
Religiosity -0.001 
 (0.96) 
Sex -0.142 
 (0.0896) 
% Urban -0.014 
 (3.16)*** 
Constant 2.467 
 (5.83)*** 
 
R Squared 
 
.16 
Observations 205 
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pushing back the years studied into previous eras, such as the 1980’s and the emergence 
of the religious right as a force within the Reagan Republicans. 
Finally, the percentage of state population classified as “urban” was found to have 
significance at the .01 level as well.  This is to be expected, considering the close ties of 
minority and union voters to the Democratic Party and the connection between rural 
voters and the Republican Party.  With party identification having such a strong 
significance, it is not surprising to find that a factor that so clearly defines voters’ self-
identification would be just as significant. 
However, the evidence that the Republican Party has indeed become less likely to 
deviate from national policy is striking.  To observe this, I assigned a score to each 
candidate that represents the distance between the average partisan score assigned in this 
study and the “perfect” score of their respective party (0 for Democrats, 4 for 
Republicans).  For instance, a Democrat who obtained an average partisan score of 1.1 
would have a deviation score of 1.1, the difference between 0 and the average partisan 
score obtained.  A Republican with a 2.6 average partisan score would be assigned a 1.4 
deviation score, as they are 1.4 away from their perfect score of 4.   
In 2006, Republicans had higher average deviation scores than Democrats in both 
competitive states, and in states in which the Democratic Party held control, though in 
both cases their median deviation score was lower than the Democratic candidates’ 
medians, especially in competitive states (Figure 4).  This clustering of candidate scores  
  
 
Figure 4. Policy Deviation Scores for 2006
towards the bottom end of the scale evidences a powerful drive, even in the most 
unfriendly of states, to remain adherent to the national party platform.  
By 2008, the phenomenon has become even clearer (
now only exceed Democrati
as the literature and hypotheses discussed previously indicate, is expected.  Again, even 
in Democratic states, the Republican mean deviation score is lower than that of the 
Democrats, showing clustering at lower levels of deviation, despite circumstances 
generally unfavorable to the Republican Party.
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Figure 5. Policy Deviation Scores for 2008
Finally, by 2010 the Republican policy cohesion has become even more stark 
(Figure 6).  Once again, only in states in which they constitute the minority party are the 
Republicans found to have higher deviation scores than Democrats.  However, in this 
case the mean deviation score of the Republican candidates is significantly lower than 
that of the Democrats, indicating that the higher deviation scores are observed in a 
smaller number of candidates.  In Republican and competitive states, Republican scores 
are strikingly lower. 
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Figure 6. Policy Deviation Scores for 2010
This observation of deviation scores lends even more weight to H
literature than undergirds it.  The reductions in Republican policy deviation are truly 
striking and research that includes the years 2012 and 2014 are likely to find even more 
clear policy adherence. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
The growth in the number of single-party dominated states shows no sign of 
slowing.  The explosion in the number of single-party dominated states in 2012 and 2014 
shows a powerful schism in the American electorate that provides a window into the 
hyper-partisan atmosphere of national politics.  As mentioned earlier, this elimination of 
competition within a state political system encourages more extreme partisanship in 
candidates, as purity tests and competitive party primaries require more strict adherence 
to the national platform. 
The results of examining candidate policy positions support all five hypotheses, 
with one minor exception in the year 2010.  Policy deviation among candidates was more 
commonly found in states in which those candidates constituted a partisan minority.  It 
would be unwise to attribute this phenomenon solely to the factor of party control within 
a state, as there is no way to quantify the exact reasoning behind a candidate’s policy 
choices.  However, the data show a fascinating connection between party policy deviation 
and the existing political climate within a state.  In nearly every instance, minority 
candidates were found to be more likely to deviate from national party policy than either 
their counterparts in the majority party or their fellow party members running in 
competitive states or those dominated by their own party.  
The sole deviation from the expected outcome occurred in 2010.  Republican 
candidates in that year show more policy deviation in states dominated by their own party 
than in states with a competitive partisan environment.  This could be due to the fact that 
2010 was a mid-term election year, as the party in control of the White House regularly 
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loses seats in Congress in mid-term elections (Abramowitz et al. 1986; Calabresi and 
Lindgren 2006; Bafumi et al. 2010).  In 2008, Democrat Barack Obama took power, and 
began proposing and supporting controversial legislation, such as the Affordable Care 
Act, inciting a great deal of public debate.  It is possible this encouraged Republican 
candidates in competitive states to stick closer to the national platform in an effort to 
capitalize on the expected backlash against the party in power. 
The impact and importance of the single-party domination factor is lessened by 
the significant results of the control variables, indicating that perhaps the party 
competition levels in the states is less the controlling factor for these deviations and 
simply another symptom of the true causes.  Though the party competition data did not 
appear to have a significant effect, the levels of party competition in the individual states 
is still a powerful indicator of electoral outcomes and candidate party deviation, even if it 
is not the direct cause.  In future research, a variable could be included to account for the 
ethnic makeup of the state in question.  Time and resources did not allow for such a 
consideration in this thesis. 
The combination of the growth in these single-party states and the likelihood of 
minority candidates within them to deviate from national party policy create some 
interesting possibilities for future elections.  As the majority party candidates become 
more loyal to their national policies and the minority party candidates deviate more, it is 
possible that a new sort of “moderate” or “centrist” candidate will emerge to become an 
actual player within the political system.  This possibility is limited by the evidence that it 
is really only the Democratic Party candidates that are deviating in any meaningful way.  
Further, the runaway success of the Republican Party in winning seats in Congress over 
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the last few elections cycles offers them no reason to moderate their stances.  As long as 
Republicans continue to dominate statewide elections to the extent that they currently do, 
it is unlikely that they will see any advantage is softening policy stances.  The continued 
influence of the Tea Party and their demands for party purity make moderation even more 
unlikely. 
The more likely result of such deviation is a weakening of the Democratic Party 
within Congress.  If the party platform is being watered down by candidates and 
incumbents who deviate significantly from overall party goals, they are unlikely to be 
able to effectively challenge a much more united Republican Party when it comes to 
divisive legislation and close floor votes.  This could become a self-perpetuating cycle, as 
the weakened Democratic Party finds winning Congressional seats more and more 
difficult as they fracture over policy. 
Though I believe the insight provided by this study is an important addition to the 
understanding of the modern climate regarding Congressional elections, it is certainly not 
complete.  Given more time and resources, there are several ways in which this study can 
be expanded and improved.  The scope of the data observed was necessarily limited by 
both deadline requirements and the difficulty associated with retrieving cached versions 
of defunct campaign websites. 
Primarily, the years examined could be expanded.  Though retrieving the data 
used to determine the number of single-party dominated states for the years 2012 and 
2014 was a simple process, the Library of Congress archives did not offer access to the 
campaign websites of Senate candidates for those years.  If the data for those years could 
be obtained, it would offer a more precise examination of the effects imposed by the 
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examined variables.  Additionally, collecting data for earlier elections could offer 
perspective on how this phenomenon has evolved and its true impact on elections.  Being 
able to examine campaigns that took place during earlier midterm elections could help to 
deepen our understanding of differences between midterm and Presidential election years 
when it comes to Congressional elections and state politics. 
Additionally, the study could be expanded to include candidates for the House of 
Representatives.  As this chamber is considered “the people’s house” and has two year 
election cycles as opposed to a staggered six year election cycle, examining these 
campaigns could significantly sharpen the view of candidate policy deviation.  A two 
year election cycle is necessarily more reactionary than a six year cycle, as candidates 
face reelection more often and are not as likely to be able to ignore acute political 
situations.  If a controversial issue emerges in the middle of a Senator’s six year term, 
that representative has a longer window of time to allow that issue to leave the national 
consciousness.  A Congressman, however, is not as able to ignore such issues, as they 
must begin campaigning again almost immediately after the end of the previous election.  
This would widen the sample size by an enormous margin.  The two Houses could be 
compared separately for each year to gauge possible differences between the two types of 
campaigns, as well as combined for a better overview of the two parties. 
Furthermore, the policy positions examined could be expanded.  This study faced 
deadlines that necessitated a streamlined number of policy areas to be examined.  An 
expanded study could include more areas, as well as adjust the policies examined year by 
year to reflect issues that emerge between platforms.  For instance, the Affordable Care 
Act emerged during the years between the 2008 and 2012 party platforms, and is 
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therefore not directly addressed in 2008.  However, it became a major source of political 
upheaval almost immediately and could therefore be used as a more appropriate 
comparison between the parties in the 2010 campaigns.  This more fluid policy 
examination could also be used to highlight the subtle, iterative changes in each party’s 
platforms, especially in the realm of issues like climate change and immigration. 
Additionally, a more in depth examination of the factors that lead to political 
homogeneity in states would be possible with more time and resources.  The observed 
campaign positions could then be compared to the data regarding racial makeups, 
religious populations, and rural/urban divides to attempt to explain some of the outcomes.  
While those factors were discussed in a general way within this study, time and funding 
limitations restricted the actual examination of these factors on a state-by-state basis.  
Future research could correlate the actual data on these factors not only to the campaigns 
of the candidates, but to the eventual winners of these elections to examine the effects 
they may have.  The data could also be expanded to include statewide offices other than 
state legislatures and governors to provide a more nuanced view of party competition 
within a state.  
Finally, the actual outcomes of these elections could be examined to determine 
the value of these policy deviations.  Each race could be examined on its own to 
determine not only for the origin and frequency of policy deviation, but what advantage, 
if any, such deviations offer a candidate, either of the majority or minority party.  If these 
deviations from national party policy are not providing any real electoral advantage to 
candidates, then there may be another reason for candidates to abandon their party during 
tough competitions.  Also, the actual voting behavior of such divergent candidates after 
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election could be recorded to determine if these policy deviations are simply a tool to win 
election, or if they actually translate into legislative action down the road. 
It is my belief that this study offers an understanding of recent political trends that 
has been lacking in the modern literature.  Though there have been studies regarding 
political competition in states and studies regarding policy deviation, the two factors have 
never been combined to attempt to explain the effect they have on one another and 
campaigns in general.  This study can offer a springboard into a new way of looking at 
the way political candidates moderate their policy positions when faced with an 
unfavorable political landscape. 
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